The Dynamics of Power in Labor Markets: Monopolistic Unions versus Monopsonistic Employers | Resubmission in preparation at Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

This paper brings together the literatures on employer power and employee power by studying the effect of unions on earnings, employment, and inequality across differently concentrated markets. Exploiting changes to union dues subsidies as exogenous shocks to firm-level union density in Norway, we show that high levels of unionization mitigate the negative wage and employment effects generated by imperfect competition. We also identify considerable effect heterogeneity with respect to worker types across differentially concentrated markets and show that this has major implications for the role of unions in shaping labor market wage inequality.

Samuel Dodini

Senior Research Economist

My broad research interests include empirical explorations of the economics of labor markets, incorporating insights from behavioral economics, occupational licensing, monopsony power, education, public finance, and urban economics.